The Community Rating Principle
Until the 1970s, health care in Australia was financed mainly by direct payments from patients and from private health insurers operating on the basis of community rating. This principle requires insurers to offer everyone the same contribution rates for a given level of cover. It may be contrasted with actuarial (or experience) rating, under which different premiums are charged that reflect differences in risk. Actuarial rating applies to cars, for example: insurance for expensive cars costs more than insurance for cheap cars (other things equal), since repairing or replacing them likewise costs more. But under community-rated health insurance, the premium for a person aged 25 is the same as that for someone aged 65, even though the latter is likely to incur much larger health care costs within any given period.
Community rating has a good deal of emotional appeal. A propensity to require a high level of health care implies misfortune, and community rating lessens the misfortune by sharing the financial burden among the whole community. High-risk groups thus claim more in benefits from their insurer than they pay in as contributions, while low-risk groups contribute more than they claim. To a large degree, the high-risk groups comprise the old, the chronically ill, and larger families (who pay the same premiums as childless couples); the low-risk groups comprise the young and healthy, and singles and couples without children, who can well afford to contribute in excess of their own treatment costs.
But it is precisely this characteristic that give rise to a major difficulty with community rating: it amounts to a tax on low-risk groups to provide a subsidy to highrisk groups. Human nature being what it is, people have a desire to avoid paying taxes, and to put themselves in the position where they will benefit from any available subsidies. W hen only community-rated insurance is available, many low-risk people will escape the implicit tax by declining to buy insurance, while high-risk people can be expected to avail themselves of the implicit subsidy by buying insurance -perhaps with a higher level of cover than they would choose in the absence of the subsidy. As a result, the insurer ends up covering disproportionately more of the high risks: those who, as a group, make relatively more and larger claims. As the average cost of claims per member rises, contributions have to be increased if the insurer is to remain financially viable. But the higher die contribution rates, the bigger the implicit tax on low-risk groups, and the fewer die number of persons from diese groups who will still want insurance. The larger die number of high-risk persons rcladve to low-risk persons, die more severe die problem becomes.
For diis reason, die long-term viability of community rated insurance is very uncertain in die absence of compulsion. This inherent weakness arguably contributed significandy to die number of persons choosing not to be insured by Australia's community-rated private health funds in the 1960s and early 1970s. The obvious consequences were extreme financial hardship for those who required expensive treatment as a result of unforeseen serious accidents or illnesses but who had taken die risk of not insuring, and a growing financial burden for the public hospital system, which treated such people even when diey could not afford to pay.
The Budgetary Consequences of Medibank/Medicare
I his, in turn, was the main catalyst f or the introduction of universal insurance, in the form of the original Medibank scheme of 1975. This scheme aimed to make health care available to all who needed it, even if they were not privately insured.* Paradoxically, however, the existence of what is now known as Medicare makes the problem even worse for private health insurance. All permanent residents have access to Medicare, for which they pay through taxes, and this significantly weakens the incentive to purchase health insurance privately. Indeed, the only reason to purchase insurance is that the quality of cover provided by Medicare is perceived to be inferior. Specifically, Medicare provides for treatment only in shared wards in public hospitals, relying on doctors chosen by those hospitals. As well, there are long waiting lists for admission. If all people thought public hospital treatment was as good as private hospital treatment in all respects, and that choice of doctor was unimportant, there would be no demand at all for private hospital treatment or private health insurance.
The strong disincentive to purchasing costly private insurance serves to com pound die effect of die community radng requirement. Rather than being simply the soludon to die problem of those who would choose not to insure privately, Medicare has come to be seen as an acceptable alternative form of insurance by large numbers of people who odierwise would have been happy to do so. Thus, although the charming fiction of near-free access to healdi care for everybody has been sold to voters in numerous election campaigns, lime has shown that we arc not prepared to be taxed heavily enough to make this possible. T he task of governments in reality has been to find an electorally acceptable balance between taxing us to pay for Medicare, and winding back the quality of healdi treatment available to Medicare users.
Tax Rebates to Encourage Opting Out of Medicare
Medicare is 'free', in die sense diat one has to pay income tax whether or not one calls on its resources. I hose who desire merely the increment in quality of cover diat private insurance provides diercforc have to be prepared to pay die full cost of private insurance. A possible means of offsetdng diis significant distortion is to provide a tax rebate to people who purchase private insurance (and in so doing implicidy choose not to rely on Medicare). More people can be expected to pur chase private insurance if by doing so they arc relieved of some or all of the burden of having to contribute to Medicare. This is the approach announced in the Commonwealth Budget for 1996/97.
How big should the rebate be? The amounts announced in die Budget were fairly small, at least for relatively low-income earners: $100 for singles, $200 for couples, and $350 for families (plus additional amounts for ancillary cover). This group comprises individuals with annual incomes up to $35,000, and couples and one-child families widi incomes up to $70,000; die income threshold rises by $3,000 for each additional child. Much larger rebates are available to relatively high-income earners, for whom the rebate is 1 per cent of taxable income. This group comprises individuals with incomes above $50,000 and couples and families widi incomes above $100,000. The marginal tax rate for this group was simultane ously increased by 1 per cent (characterised as a 'Medicare Ixvy Surcharge'), but since diey can escape the extra tax by purchasing private insurance, the new ar rangements amount to a tax rebate which is propordonal to income. For example, a couple or a family widi a combined income of $100,000 would receive a rebate of $ 1,000 -roughly equivalent to die full cost of basic private insurance cover widi a front-end deducdble (or excess) of $500. People widi still higher incomes would actually obtain rebates in excess o/ die cost of private insurance.
The implicadons of die new arrangements are wordi nodng. lx>w-income indi viduals obtain access to (somewhat inferior) Medicare hospital cover at the cost of the tax rebate forgone, amoundng to $100. High-income individuals obtain access to private insurance -widi freedom to choose both hospital and doctor, and to avoid waidng lists -free of charge, or even at negadve cost. In die middle, indi viduals earning $35,000-$50,000 get Medicare cover at no cost, but have to pay the full cost of private insurance if diat is dieir preference. Similar implicadons apply to couples and families.
This strategy may or may not achieve budgetary savings. Among lower-income earners, each couple opdng for private cover will cost die government $200 annu ally; but if dieir likely cost of Medicare benefits was, say, $1,000, there is an implied saving of $800. On die odier hand, die rebate will also (low to those individuals who have already chosen to be privately insured. The strategy dius imposes on die government die fixed cost of giving die rebate to all cxisdng lower-income, privately insured taxpayers. (Middle-income earners arc not affected by die changes, while die number of reladvely high-income earners -about 110,000 singles and 100,000 couples and families, according to a Department of Hcaldi and Family Services press release, 'Private Hcaldi Insurance', of 20 August 1996 -appears too small to have any major budgetary impact.)
A delicate balance is involved. If the rebate is too small, not many low-income earners will make die switch, and die cost of paying die rebate to cxisdng privately insured taxpayers may exceed the gains from slighdy reducing the numbers of peo ple reliant on Medicare. If die rebate is large rcladve to the average cost imposed by individuals in Medicare, many could be expected to switch to private insurance; but die net gain from each person who leaves will be small and die fixed cost of the rebate to those already privately insured will be even larger dian in the first case, thus again resuldng in a net increase in die government's overall health budget. It is possible diat diere is no rebate capable of yielding a budgetary gain; and even if there is, the gain may be small. Indeed, the government itself has stated, in a De partment of Hcaldi and Family Services press release of 20 August 1996, 'Financial Incentives to Boost Private Health Insurance', that its primary aim is merely 'to ar rest the decline' in private fund membership. This is not to say that the changes will be devoid of benefit: presumably the government is also motivated, to some extent, by a desire to mitigate the inequity involved in forcing those who are privately in sured to contribute to the insurance of those who are not.
Actuarial Rating for Private Health Insurance
A more promising approach to reforming Australia's health insurance industry is to combine withdrawal of the community-rating requirement with a subsidy scheme for the purchase of health insurance.
Under actuarial rating, insurers would be free to set different premiums for different sections of the population. People would be classified by various criteria such as age, sex, occupation, previous health experience -indeed, any criterion at all believed by the insurer to give some indication of the degree of health risk -and their premium levels determined accordingly.
Among existing members of private healdi funds, actuarial rating would raise premiums for high-risk groups and lower them for low-risk groups. Some members of tiie high-risk group could be expected to drop their existing cover, and rely in stead on Medicare; this would increase the cost to taxpayers of Medicare. At the same time, some members of die low-risk group not presently insured would now choose to purchase private insurance, thus reducing the cost of Medicare. T he net effect on die budget would depend on die reladve numbers of 'movers' and differ ences in reladve costs.
It seems quite likely diat die costs of adding high-cost individuals to Medicare would outweigh die savings from shifting low-cost individuals to private insurance. High-risk individuals would have a strong incentive to drop private insurance, but low-risk individuals would have only a weak incentive to take it up, because uneven ness in die distribution of risk means dial die small high-risk group would see a large rise in their premiums, while die large low-risk group would see a relatively small fall in dieirs. This is probably die major explanation for successive govern ments' reluctance to remove die community rating requirement. It would also help to explain support for diis principle from die private healdi funds diemselves: widiout it, dicy would lose market share to Medicare.
Targeting Health Insurance Subsidies
Supporters of community-rated insurance are troubled by the fact that, under actuarial rating, high-risk groups pay more dian low-risk groups. Yet actuarial rating is not in compatible with die widely accepted view that high-risk groups should have their costs subsidised by low-risk groups. Actuarial rating can be combined with direct subsidies to die high-risk groups, sufficient to make health insurance readily affordable. PreFor brevity's sake, the discussion that follows focuses mainly on hospital, as distinct from medical, cover. At present, die private funds are primarily concerned with the former.
sumably, however, low-risk individuals with low incomes should not be called on to subsidise high-risk, but high-income individuals. Any subsidies for gaining access to health insurance should be directed so as to benefit those who are both high healdi risks and relatively poor, and paid for by those who are both low health risks and relatively well off. Suppose, then, a subsidy were provided in the form of a tax re bate which increased both as die premium increased (to assist diose with higher health risks) and as taxable income decreased (to assist those with low incomes). Much less tax revenue would be required to subsidise health care for diose in real need than to subsidise everyone, as Medicare attempts to do.
O f course, even with die subsidy, diere would still be the distorting influence of the opdon of staying in Medicare at die small cost of forgoing the tax rebate that would be available to those who opted out. To remove this distortion, Medicare would start charging for membership, in the same manner as private insurers, to cover actuarially esdmated costs plus a margin of profit (diat is, widiout relying on tax revenue). People who elected to stay widi Medicare, of course, would receive the same subsidies, dirough tax rebates, as those who shifted to private insurers.
The financial details of a model of the proposed subsidy scheme are shown in Figures la and lb. The model is intended to illustrate die general principles only, and would need to be adjusted in die light of the full range of premiums determined by insurers, togedicr widi polidcal judgments about a tolerable total ouday on die subsidy. Each curve in die diagrams shows die net (subsidised) premium paid for families widi a given level of taxable income. Figure lb is similar to Figure la , but focuses on annual premiums up to $5,000, which would account for a large majority of die populadon. Some figures are provided by way of illustradon in Table 1 . Table 1 Net insurance premiums for selected combinations of family income and family gross insurance premiums ($ per annum)* The important characteristics of the model arc as follows:
Gross family premium
• The subsidy increases with increases in the premium (for a given income); people who are higher healdi risks receive higher subsidies. (The subsidy is the vertical distance between the curve and the diagonal line, along which the sub sidy is zero.)
• The slope of each curve is always positive, indicating that the individual always has to pay at least some portion of any increase in the gross premium. This is important, in order to ensure that people have an incentive to shop around for die cheapest insurer and, conversely, that insurers have an incentive to keep their costs as low as possible.
• The subsidy decreases widi increasing income (for a given premium); people with higher incomes receive lower subsidies.
• Aldiough it is not apparent in die diagrams, the mathemadcal formuladon of the subsidy is designed to ensure that the rate of decline of the subsidy as in come increases is not so rapid as to remove or seriously diminish the incendve to earn addidonal income. The disincendve effect of high marginal rates of income taxadon, under which only a small propordon of each addihonal dollar of income earned is retained as disposable income, is well known. A problem widi the present proposal (which is unavoidable, if die subsidy is to decline as income increases) is diat it tends to increase die effecdve marginal rate of taxadon: reducing die rate of subsidy as income increases has die same effect as in creasing die marginal tax rate. But die addidon to die marginal tax rate has been kept small, except for a very small propordon of die populadon who have very high healdi risks and very low incomes.
The subsidy scheme has been designed so diat die net premium in no case ex ceeds an arbitrary limit of 25 per cent of taxable income. A lower or higher ceiling could be imposed, rcsuldng in higher or lower tax revenue requirements; it would be sensible to adjust the ceiling in die light of experience widi operadng die scheme. It might also be necessary to set up different arrangements altogether for diose who are bodi very poor and chronically ill, since insurance is not really die appropriate mechanism for financing healdi care in diis circumstance. (It may be objected that everybody receives at least some subsidy, no matter how well off they may be. But die subsidy is paid for by taxadon, and die wealdiy pay far more tax dian the poor. tax and subsidy scheme taken together, not the impact of the subsidy scheme alone.)
Administrative Details
Payment of the health insurance subsidy would be administered through the exist ing income tax system. The subsidy takes the form of a tax rebate that either in creases the end-of-year tax refund or reduces any additional tax payable. Alterna tively, individuals could submit information to their employers regarding their out lays on basic insurance cover (as they do already in relation to dependants' allow ances), and have the relevant subsidy amount credited against their normal PAYE deductions. Individuals who failed to produce evidence of insurance cover in their income tax returns would have to make an additional tax payment. The govern ment would use die amounts collected to purchase insurance for the individuals concerned from Medicare or from private insurers, but the additional payment would be high enough to cover this expense as well as to impose a penalty that would provide an incentive to individuals to purchase insurance of their own ac cord. The meaning of 'basic insurance cover' requires elaboration. Hospitals are in many respects akin to hotels: with both, individuals' preferences differ in relation to accommodation. Many are happy to be placed in a shared ward, odiers prefer a private ward using a shared bathroom, yet others would prefer their own room with extra thick carpet and en suite facilities. Profit-oriented hospitals can be expected to make available all standards of accommodation for w'hich there is a demand at a price which will cover the cost of provision. But as the cost of different standards of accommodation ranges widely, health insurers would need to offer different levels of insurance cover appropriate to their contributors' diverse preferences for ac commodation. The healtli insurance subsidy, however, like Medicare at present, is directed to die provision of a basic level of hospital accommodation consistent with effective treaünent, but without non-essential frills. Table 2 Hypothetical insurance premiums ($ per annum)
R is k c ateg o ry
Prem ium s Basic rate O n e s ta r Two s ta r T h ree s tar Low 800 960 1,200 1,800 ml 1,500 1,900 2,200 3,000 m2 3,000 3,600 4,600 6,000 High 6,000 7,000 9,000 12,000
Many people, then, would want to purchase higher levels of cover. Their re bate would not be based on their actual insurance premium, however, but on what their premium would be if they were insuring at the basic level. This makes it nec essary to require each insurer to inform the tax office of its schedule of charges, for each distinct risk group that it identifies, and for all levels of cover, including the basic level (a simplified hypothetical example is shown in Table 2 ). It would then periodically certify in respect of each of its contributors the risk category to which he or she belonged, the level of cover, and the actual premium paid. Thus, a con tributor in risk category m2 would face a basic cover premium of $3,000 a year, but might choose 'two star' cover for $4,600. Nevertheless, her insurance subsidy would be based on the $3,000 figure (in combination with her taxable income).
Insurers could be expected to explore ways of increasing the size of the subsidy to their contributors, thereby attracting more business to themselves. One way would be to overstate the charge for basic cover. This could be detected by observ ing the level of demand for basic cover insurance (through an audit procedure): if there was little or none, the insurer could be considered to be not playing by the rules, and could be subjected to sanctions of some kind. It would not be feasible to falsely assign contributors to higher-risk categories, because the actual premiums paid and die level of cover purchased would have been certified and would be sub ject to audit checking.
The Proposals Summarised
Under diese proposals, hospital insurance would be provided on a profit-oriented basis by the government, through Medicare, competing on equal terms widi private insurers. Bodi Medicare and private insurers would provide die basic standard of insurance plus higher levels of cover (for private ward accommodadon, for exam ple), in accordance widi die demands of dieir contributors. But Medicare would be financed not from general tax revenue (as it is now), but from die flow of premium payments from its members.
Hcaldi insurance would be compulsory and therefore universal, but people would pay for it dirccdy. The poor and diose widi high health risks would be pro tected by a safety net consisting of carefully targeted subsidies in die form of tax re bates. These subsidies would be administered not dirough Medicare but dirough die income tax system. These proposals would make possible a significant reduction in both taxadon and government expenditure. Commonwealdi government oudays on healdi at tributable to die Medicare system are of the order of $15 billion annually, which suggests die size of potendal tax savings from taking Medicare insurance (including the funding of public hospitals) out of the budget. If this amount were distributed over, say, 10m taxpayers, the cut in each individual's income tax could be around $1,500 (before allowing for the subsidy). Since people would now pay for health insurance direedy, rather than indirectly through taxes, they could strongly influence die types and levels of insurance cover offered by virtue of dieir decisions as to what they bought, and from whom.
Under the proposed arrangements, Medicare would not be restricted to provid ing cover for treatment only at public hospitals. The public hospitals would be made to compete for patients by making them dependent for revenue on demand for their services diat was no longer artificially boosted. There would dien be no need for any disdnedon between public and private hospitals. On the contrary, die aim would be to get all hospitals to compete on equal terms, as in the case of Medi care and die private insurers. The impact on Telstra of forcing it to compete widi Optus suggests diat, in bodi cases, these would provide a significant sdmulus to im provement.
The only healdi insurance burden on die taxpayer would be that needed to fi nance die subsidies to the reladvely small propordon of the populadon who were both high healdi risks and poor. The government would sdll be in the business of operadng hospitals and providing healdi insurance, but it would no longer have the compeddve advantage of being able to offer something Tree' to the public by virtue of taxpayer support. If experience showed that it could not compete on a level playing field, of course, the next logical step would be privadsadon.
Broken Promises?
Ii die present government were to implement diese proposals, it would be accused of breaking its elecdon promises to retain Medicare and community radng. It could jusdfy breaking diese promises, however, by arguing that it had retained the essence ol Medicare, even though die system was being radically altered.
W hat dien is die essence of Medicare, and how would die reform proposals preserve it?
• Medicare ensures universal health cover. Everyone is assured o f having access to medical and hospital care as needed, widioul facing the prospect o f poten tially crippling expenses. The new scheme would be more genuinely universal, because it would get rid of waidng lists, and permit padent choice of doctor. It would be more efficient, because it would make use of all hospitals rather than only public hospitals, permitdng greater padent freedom of choice in this re spect also.
• It provides free medical and hospital insurance, paid for out o f general tax revenues. Under the new scheme, individuals choose among Medicare and private insurers, and have to pay for the insurance cover chosen. In return, the income tax schedule (including die exisdng Medicare levy) is modified so as to generate significant tax reduedons for all taxpayers.
• It provides non-transparent cross-subsidies from the majority o f the population who have low healdi risks to the minority who have high health risks, without regard to individual income levels. The new scheme would also subsidise high health-risk individuals at the expense of low-risk individuals but, at the same time, would make the subsidies transparent, and modify them in accordance with differences in ability to pay.
Conclusion
Steadfast adherence to the inherently flawed community rating principle in health insurance has been responsible for an unending stream of policy interventions un der successive governments, all intended to patch up the problems community rat ing causes. These have created a highly distorted and inefficient system of health care in Australia. The underlying aim may well have been to protect less fortunate members of the community, but this concern has not been matched by clear or creative thinking as to how best to achieve this objective. The most obvious symp tom is die coexistence of long waiting lists for admission to public hospitals and ex cess capacity in private hospitals, but die recent proposal that newly trained doctors will not be given Medicare provider numbers will have the effect of causing an un conscionable wastage of diese human resources to match die underudlisation of private sector infrastructure. It is possible to design a system of healdi insurance subsidies which protects die least fortunate, but which at die same lime minimises the need for tax revenues and an extensive healdi bureaucracy, and gives individuals freedom of choice in reladon to levels of insurance, insurers, doctors and hospitals. Such a system, the broad oudincs of which have been presented here, would be far more effeedve in provid ing die quality of healdi care people want, radier dian what governments diink they should have, and in bringing about considerable improvements in efficiency.
